Google-owned Mandiant on Friday stated it recognized an “growth in risk exercise” that makes use of tradecraft in step with extortion-themed assaults orchestrated by a financially motivated hacking group referred to as ShinyHunters.
The assaults leverage superior voice phishing (aka vishing) and bogus credential harvesting websites mimicking focused corporations to achieve unauthorized entry to sufferer environments by amassing sign-on (SSO) credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes.
The top purpose of the assaults is to focus on cloud-based software-as-a-service (SaaS) functions to siphon delicate information and inside communications and extort victims.
The tech big’s risk intelligence crew stated it is monitoring the exercise below a number of clusters, together with UNC6661, UNC6671, and UNC6240 (aka ShinyHunters), in order to account for the chance that these teams might be evolving their modus operandi or mimicking beforehand noticed ways.
“Whereas this technique of concentrating on identification suppliers and SaaS platforms is in step with our prior observations of risk exercise previous ShinyHunters-branded extortion, the breadth of focused cloud platforms continues to develop as these risk actors search extra delicate information for extortion,” Mandiant famous.
“Additional, they look like escalating their extortion ways with current incidents, together with harassment of sufferer personnel, amongst different ways.”
Particulars of the vishing and credential theft exercise are as follows –
- UNC6661 has been noticed pretending to be IT workers in calls to staff at focused sufferer organizations, directing them to credential harvesting hyperlinks below the guise of instructing them to replace their multi-factor authentication (MFA) settings. The exercise was recorded between early and mid-January 2026.
- The stolen credentials are then used to register their very own machine for MFA after which transfer laterally throughout the community to exfiltrate information from SaaS platforms. In a minimum of one case, the risk actor weaponized their entry to compromised e-mail accounts to ship extra phishing emails to contacts at cryptocurrency-focused corporations. The emails have been subsequently deleted to cowl up the tracks. That is adopted by extortion exercise carried out by UNC6240.
- UNC6671 has additionally been recognized as impersonating IT workers to deceive victims as a part of efforts to acquire their credentials and MFA authentication codes on victim-branded credential harvesting websites since early January 2026. In a minimum of some situations, the risk actors gained entry to Okta buyer accounts. UNC6671 has additionally leveraged PowerShell to obtain delicate information from SharePoint and OneDrive.
- The variations between UNC6661 and UNC6671 relate to the usage of completely different area registrars for registering the credential harvesting domains (NICENIC for UNC6661 and Tucows for UNC6671), in addition to the truth that an extortion e-mail despatched following UNC6671 exercise didn’t overlap with recognized UNC6240 indicators.
- This means that completely different units of individuals could also be concerned, illustrating the amorphous nature of those cybercrime teams. What’s extra, the concentrating on of cryptocurrency companies means that the risk actors may be trying to discover additional avenues for monetary acquire.
To counter the risk posed to SaaS platforms, Google has outlined an extended listing of hardening, logging, and detection suggestions –
- Enhance assist desk processes, together with requiring personnel to require a reside video name to confirm their identification
- Restrict entry to trusted egress factors and bodily areas; implement robust passwords; and take away SMS, cellphone name, and e-mail as authentication strategies
- Limit management-plane entry, audit for uncovered secrets and techniques and implement machine entry controls
- Implement logging to extend visibility into identification actions, authorizations, and SaaS export behaviors
- Detect MFA machine enrollment and MFA life cycle adjustments; search for OAuth/app authorization occasions that recommend mailbox manipulation exercise utilizing utilities like ToogleBox E mail Recall, or identification occasions occurring outdoors regular enterprise hours
“This exercise isn’t the results of a safety vulnerability in distributors’ merchandise or infrastructure,” Google stated. “As an alternative, it continues to spotlight the effectiveness of social engineering and underscores the significance of organizations transferring in direction of phishing-resistant MFA the place potential. Strategies equivalent to FIDO2 safety keys or passkeys are immune to social engineering in ways in which push-based, or SMS authentication usually are not.”
