A newly uncovered marketing campaign involving an Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) variant has emerged, showcasing the evolving sophistication of multi-platform social engineering assaults.
This marketing campaign, found throughout routine attacker infrastructure evaluation, leverages typo-squatted domains mimicking Spectrum, a distinguished U.S.-based telecommunications supplier providing cable tv, web, and managed companies.
By using the Clickfix methodology, attackers ship tailor-made payloads primarily based on the sufferer’s working system, with macOS customers particularly focused by a malicious shell script designed to reap system passwords and deploy an AMOS variant for deeper exploitation.

This operation, marked by Russian-language feedback within the supply code, factors to the doubtless involvement of Russian-speaking cybercriminals, whereas its poorly applied supply logic reveals a swiftly constructed but harmful infrastructure.
Misleading Supply
The assault begins with victims being lured to typo-squatted domains equivalent to panel-spectrum[.]internet and spectrum-ticket[.]internet, the place they’re prompted to click on on an “Various Verification” choice.
This motion copies a malicious command to the clipboard, accompanied by platform-specific directions that usually include inconsistencies equivalent to displaying Home windows-specific steerage to macOS customers.
For non-macOS consumer brokers, a PowerShell command downloads and executes a script from a command-and-control (C2) server like cf-verifi.pages[.]dev.
Nevertheless, macOS customers obtain a Bash command that retrieves a script from applemacios[.]com/getrur/set up.sh utilizing curl with silent and redirect-following flags.
Based on the CloudSek Report, This script employs native macOS utilities to execute a devastating assault chain: it harvests the sufferer’s password by a persistent “System Password” immediate, validates it utilizing dscl . -authonly, and shops it in /tmp/.move.
The script then downloads a malicious binary dubbed “replace” (recognized by MD5 hash eaedee8fc9fe336bcde021bf243e332a) from applemacios[.]com/getrur/replace, bypasses macOS safety through the use of the stolen password with sudo -S xattr -c to take away quarantine attributes, and executes the AMOS variant after making it executable with chmod +x.
This strategy, leveraging professional instruments like sudo and xattr, considerably reduces detection by conventional endpoint safety options, permitting attackers to steal credentials, acquire persistent entry, and probably allow lateral motion inside company environments for additional intrusions like ransomware or knowledge exfiltration.
Defensive Methods
The implications of this AMOS marketing campaign are extreme, notably for company customers whose stolen credentials might grant entry to VPNs, inner methods, and delicate assets.
The usage of native macOS instructions to bypass safety mechanisms underscores the problem of detecting such threats with typical antivirus or EDR instruments.
To mitigate dangers, organizations should prioritize consumer consciousness coaching to acknowledge misleading password prompts and system verification techniques.
Hardening macOS endpoints by implementing system integrity protections and limiting unsigned script execution by Gatekeeper and MDM insurance policies is important.
Moreover, menace trying to find uncommon sudo exercise, password immediate abuse, and recognized AMOS indicators will help establish compromise early.
This marketing campaign highlights the rising development of cross-platform assaults, urging each shopper and company defenders to stay vigilant towards socially engineered threats.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Indicator Kind | Worth | Use |
---|---|---|
Area | panel-spectrum[.]internet | Clickfix Supply |
Area | spectrum-ticket[.]internet | Clickfix Supply |
Area | cf-verifi.pages[.]dev | Command and Management |
Area | applemacios[.]com | Command and Management |
MD5 Hash | eaedee8fc9fe336bcde021bf243e332a | AMOS Variant |
URL | https://cf-verifi.pages[.]dev/i.txt | Contacted URLs |
URL | https://applemacios[.]com/getrur/set up.sh | Contacted URLs |
URL | https://applemacios[.]com/getrur/replace | Contacted URLs |
Area | rugmel[.]cat | Clickfix Indicator of Future Assault |
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